OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities: A 2026 Developer Guide

Application security failures still become breach reports, regulatory work, customer notifications, and emergency engineering time. The OWASP Top 10 remains useful for one reason: the categories still map cleanly to the mistakes teams ship under real product pressure.

That matters on Supabase, Firebase, Flutter, React Native, and similar stacks. Managed platforms remove a lot of server maintenance, but they also compress risk into configuration, client code, service keys, storage rules, CI secrets, and third-party SDK choices. One permissive policy, one exposed function, or one badly handled token can turn a fast release into an incident.

The failure pattern has changed. Many teams are not building a monolith with custom auth and hand-written infrastructure. They are connecting hosted databases, edge functions, object storage, mobile app bundles, analytics SDKs, and deployment pipelines. The OWASP categories still fit. The practical fixes just need to reflect how modern apps are built and tested.

This guide focuses on how the OWASP Top 10 shows up in mobile apps and serverless-like platforms, especially Supabase and Firebase. It uses concrete remediation examples, highlights the trade-offs that matter in production, and ties common weaknesses back to the kind of checks a modern scanner such as AuditYour.App can catch during an access control review for Supabase and Firebase apps.

The goal is simple. Reduce the class of mistakes that keep reaching production, and give the team repeatable ways to prevent them.

1. A01:2021 Broken Access Control

Broken access control is still the issue I'd check first in almost any Supabase or Firebase review. If a user can read or write data outside their boundary, everything else becomes secondary.

OWASP's own project continues to emphasise access-control weaknesses as a core application risk, and UK-focused guidance repeatedly points teams back to incorrect permissions, exposed data, and server-side verification rather than trusting the client alone, especially on modern stacks that rely heavily on configuration and managed services (OWASP Top 10 project guidance).

What it looks like on Supabase and Firebase

A common Supabase mistake is enabling Row Level Security, then writing a policy that proves a user is logged in but never proves they own the row. A common Firebase mistake is broad rules that read like “allow authenticated users” when the data is tenant-specific or user-specific.

Bad Supabase policy:

create policy "authenticated users can read profiles"
on profiles
for select
to authenticated
using (true);

Better policy:

create policy "users can read their own profile"
on profiles
for select
to authenticated
using (auth.uid() = user_id);

For multi-tenant apps, add tenant checks as well:

using (
  auth.uid() = user_id
  and tenant_id = current_setting('request.jwt.claim.tenant_id', true)::uuid
);

What works in practice

Client-side checks don't count as access control. Hiding an admin button in React or Flutter only changes the interface. It doesn't change what the API will accept.

Practical rule: default deny, then grant the smallest possible action on the smallest possible scope.

Use these patterns consistently:

• Protect every sensitive table: Enable RLS on tables with user, billing, order, message, and document data.
• Check object ownership server-side: Validate user_id, tenant_id, or equivalent ownership claims in policies and functions.
• Review RPCs like API endpoints: A security definer function with weak permission checks can bypass otherwise solid table policies.
• Test as the wrong user: Run queries with another user token and confirm reads and writes fail. AuditYour.App's access control review guidance is useful for this style of validation.

The trade-off is obvious. Fine-grained policies take longer to design and can slow early development. But rebuilding tenant isolation after production data is already mixed is much more painful.

2. A02:2021 Cryptographic Failures

On modern stacks, cryptographic failures usually show up as secret handling failures. Teams don't always break encryption algorithms. They leak keys, misuse tokens, or trust the wrong execution boundary.

The most common version I see is a frontend bundle or mobile app that contains something far more privileged than it should. Developers assume users won't inspect a JavaScript bundle or decompile an APK. Attackers absolutely will.

The modern failure pattern

Supabase makes this distinction explicit. The anon key belongs in the client, but the service role key doesn't. Firebase has the same class of problem when service account credentials end up where the public can reach them.

Bad pattern in frontend code:

const supabase = createClient(
  process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL!,
  process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY!
);

Better pattern:

const supabase = createClient(
  process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL!,
  process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY!
);

Then use the service role key only in trusted server code, for example in an API route or secure job runner.

Remediation that actually holds up

Encryption advice gets hand-wavy fast, so keep it concrete:

• Separate public from privileged secrets: Frontend apps can hold identifiers and limited-scope public keys. They should never hold master credentials.
• Rotate after exposure: If a secret hit Git history, CI logs, crash logs, or an app bundle, treat it as compromised and rotate it.
• Use managed secret storage: Environment variables are only the start. Store secrets in your hosting platform's secret manager, not in code.
• Prefer server mediation: If a client needs privileged data access, route the request through trusted server code with explicit checks.

Developers sometimes argue that mobile apps “need” a secret because the app must call the backend directly. That's almost always the wrong design. Mobile apps need tokens tied to a user or device identity, not platform-wide credentials.

A second failure mode is token handling. If your app stores JWTs in places that are easy to dump, copy, or reuse, encryption elsewhere won't save you. Keep session lifetimes sensible, minimise token scope, and avoid treating bearer tokens like harmless session IDs.

3. A03:2021 Injection

Injection hasn't gone away. It's just moved into new places. On Supabase, that often means unsafe SQL in RPC functions. On Firebase or document-style backends, it can mean user-controlled filters or query fragments being treated as trusted input. On mobile backends, it can mean shelling out to utilities with concatenated arguments.

The issue is always the same. Untrusted input crosses into a query or command boundary without strict separation.

Unsafe versus safe query construction

Bad SQL function:

create or replace function search_users(user_input text)
returns setof users
language plpgsql
as $$
begin
  return query execute
    'select * from users where email = ''' || user_input || '''';
end;
$$;

Safer version:

create or replace function search_users(user_input text)
returns setof users
language sql
as $$
  select *
  from users
  where email = $1;
$$;

Bad Node.js command execution:

exec('convert ' + filename + ' output.pdf');

Safer approach:

execFile('convert', [filename, 'output.pdf']);

The trade-off most teams miss

Input validation helps, but it's not the primary control. If you validate perfectly in one path and concatenate unsafely in another, the bug still exists. Parameterisation is the control. Validation is the support layer.

Attackers don't care whether the payload came through a search box, a hidden field, a mobile client, or a webhook. If the backend builds commands from strings, they'll keep testing until one path accepts it.

Use a short remediation hierarchy:

• Parameterise first: Use $1, $2, prepared statements, ORM parameter binding, or equivalent safe APIs.
• Allowlist dynamic values: If users can sort by a field, map allowed field names explicitly. Don't pass raw column names through.
• Validate type and length: Restrict formats before the query runs.
• Fuzz test RPCs and endpoints: AuditYour.App's SQL injection scanner guidance aligns well with this kind of validation on modern app backends.

Injection is one of the easiest categories to explain and one of the easiest to reintroduce during a rushed feature release. Any time a team says “it's just an internal function”, I'd review it again.

4. A04:2021 Insecure Design

Some applications aren't broken because of one bug. They're broken because the original design assumed friendly users, trusted clients, or clean boundaries that don't exist in production.

That's insecure design. It shows up when a team launches a multi-tenant product without tenant isolation, stores sensitive files without a permissions model, or exposes admin workflows through endpoints that were never threat-modelled properly.

Design failures are expensive because code can be correct

A frontend that only fetches “my invoices” may be implemented correctly. But if the schema doesn't carry tenant ownership cleanly, or if internal functions can query all invoices without scoped checks, the design is already weak.

Typical example:

• One shared documents table
• No tenant_id
• No ownership policy
• Client passes document IDs directly
• Product later adds teams, admins, exports, and support access

At that point, every feature compounds the original mistake.

What to change before writing more code

I'd rather see a small team spend time on schema and trust boundaries than on a polished admin dashboard. Security-first design doesn't mean slowing to a crawl. It means answering a few hard questions early.

• What data belongs to whom: Model user, organisation, tenant, and role boundaries explicitly.
• Which actions need server-side approval: Don't let the client define privilege.
• What happens when a token is stolen: Design session expiry, re-auth for sensitive actions, and revocation paths.
• How do you investigate abuse: Add audit events before you need them.

A lot of indie products skip this because managed platforms feel safe by default. They aren't. They're productive by default. That's different.

If you're building on Supabase or Firebase, insecure design often starts with “we'll tighten rules later”. In practice, later usually means after customers, migrations, and support exceptions have made the original model much harder to fix.

5. A05:2021 Broken Authentication

Credential theft remains one of the most common ways attackers get into production systems. In modern apps, the break usually is not the identity provider itself. It is the way sessions, tokens, recovery flows, and privileged actions are wired around it.

Supabase Auth and Firebase Auth are good starting points. I recommend them often. But managed auth only reduces the amount of custom code you need to secure. It does not remove the need to secure session storage, revoke old devices, rotate refresh tokens, or force re-authentication before high-risk changes.

The recurring failures are predictable:

• Long-lived tokens stored where JavaScript or a compromised device can read them
• No refresh token rotation or no device-level session visibility
• Password reset, magic link, and OTP endpoints without rate limits
• MFA disabled for admins, support staff, and finance roles
• No fresh auth check before email, password, payout, or billing changes

On web, prefer httpOnly cookies over localStorage for session material. On mobile, store tokens in Keychain or Keystore, not in plain async storage or shared preferences. This is one of the most common gaps I see in React Native and Flutter apps that otherwise use a solid backend.

if (!session || session.expires_at < Date.now() / 1000) {
  throw new Error('Session expired');
}

Keep that check on the server for any sensitive action. The client can help with UX, but the API has to enforce session validity, recent login requirements, and role checks.

For Supabase, a practical pattern is to separate normal authenticated access from sensitive account changes. Require a recent sign-in before updating email, password, or payment settings, and make sure Row Level Security does not treat any valid session as equally trusted. For Firebase, review custom claims carefully and expire increased privileges aggressively. Support tooling is another weak point. If your team can impersonate users, log every use of that feature and put MFA in front of it.

A good baseline for product teams looks like this:

• Use provider-managed auth instead of building login flows yourself
• Set short access token lifetimes and rotate refresh tokens
• Use secure, platform-native storage for mobile sessions
• Add MFA for privileged roles first, then expand based on risk
• Rate limit login, reset, magic-link, and OTP endpoints
• Offer device/session revocation from the user account screen
• Require fresh authentication for high-impact account changes

If you want a related checklist for what often gets exposed after auth breaks down, review this guide to sensitive data exposure in modern apps.

AuditYour.App is useful here because broken authentication often shows up as a chain, not a single bug. A mobile build leaks a token into storage, an API accepts stale sessions, and an account settings endpoint skips re-auth. That combination is exactly what scanning should surface early.

Teams that collect customer data should document the downstream handling too. Our data privacy practices are part of the same trust boundary. Authentication decides who gets in. Privacy controls decide what happens next.

6. A06:2021 Sensitive Data Exposure

Sensitive data exposure is often self-inflicted. The app returns too much data, logs too much data, caches too much data, or stores too much data for too long.

For startups, the most common issue isn't exotic crypto failure. It's over-sharing. A profile endpoint returns date of birth, internal notes, and billing metadata because it was convenient for the frontend once and never tightened afterward.

Minimise first, then protect harder

If an API only needs id, name, and avatar_url, don't send the whole user record. The more fields you return, the more places exposure spreads: browser caches, app logs, analytics tools, support screenshots, and third-party crash reporting.

Bad API response:

{
  "id": "user_123",
  "email": "user@example.com",
  "date_of_birth": "1991-01-01",
  "internal_notes": "chargeback review",
  "password_reset_token": "..."
}

Better API response:

{
  "id": "user_123",
  "email": "user@example.com",
  "display_name": "Sam"
}

Where teams usually leak data

This category deserves a systematic review, not a quick grep.

• Logs: Never log passwords, bearer tokens, payment data, or full personal records.
• Errors: Don't leak connection strings, stack traces with secrets, or internal identifiers to clients.
• Backups and exports: Treat them like production data, because they are.
• Mobile storage: Don't keep plaintext sensitive data on-device without a clear need.

For privacy-sensitive products, document retention matters as much as access control. If the app doesn't need to keep a field, delete it. Fewer stored secrets mean fewer breach paths.

For a deeper remediation mindset around overexposed records, logging mistakes, and response minimisation, AuditYour.App's guide to sensitive data exposure is useful. If your team also needs a policy reference point for handling personal data, our data privacy practices show the kind of operational clarity users increasingly expect.

7. A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures

This category overlaps with broken authentication, but the useful distinction in practice is identity proof and session trust. Are you sure the caller is who they claim to be, and are you validating that trust on every sensitive server-side path?

Modern backends often get sloppy when teams validate auth in middleware, then skip claim checks in a serverless function, RPC, or internal endpoint because “the user is already signed in”.

The dangerous shortcut

A user sends user_id in a request body. The server accepts it and updates that user's data. No one verifies that the request's subject matches that user_id.

Bad handler:

await db.from('profiles')
  .update({ display_name: body.display_name })
  .eq('id', body.user_id);

Safer pattern:

const authUserId = session.user.id;

await db.from('profiles')
  .update({ display_name: body.display_name })
  .eq('id', authUserId);

If the user should only ever act on their own record, don't accept their target identity from the client at all.

Session trust needs deliberate checks

This matters especially in mobile apps and BaaS-connected clients where session reuse can drift into unsafe territory.

• Validate JWT claims: Check issuer, subject, expiry, and any tenant or role claims that matter to authorisation.
• Bind sensitive actions to current identity: Use the server's authenticated identity, not client-submitted identifiers.
• Harden recovery flows: Password reset and email change flows often leak user existence or accept replayed tokens.
• Use secure cookie flags on web: HttpOnly, Secure, and SameSite aren't optional for session cookies.

A common engineering shortcut is to trust “internal” RPCs because only the app uses them. But if the app can call them, so can an attacker with the same token unless you add stronger checks.

8. A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures

This category matters more now than many older OWASP explainers admit. Modern apps depend on package registries, CI runners, third-party SDKs, build scripts, hosted update paths, and generated client code. If you trust those inputs blindly, you've created a wide attack surface before your code even runs.

Recent OWASP-oriented summaries have put more emphasis on supply-chain and deployment integrity alongside broken access control, cryptographic failures, and security misconfiguration, which is a better fit for how teams build software today (SentinelOne's OWASP Top 10 overview).

Where integrity fails in app teams

The obvious case is a malicious or compromised dependency. The less obvious cases are often more common:

• CI pipelines that pull unpinned dependencies on every run
• Docker images built from unreviewed base images
• Third-party scripts loaded without review
• App update mechanisms that trust whatever artifact appears next
• Internal admin tools deployed from branches without approval controls

Controls that are worth the effort

You don't need enterprise bureaucracy to improve integrity. You do need discipline.

npm ci
npm audit

Those commands won't solve the whole problem, but they're a better baseline than ad hoc installs. Prefer deterministic installs and reviewable lockfiles over “latest” everywhere.

Use trust boundaries in your build pipeline the same way you use them in your app. Verify provenance, pin versions, and restrict who can publish what.

A practical short list:

• Pin dependency versions: Don't let production builds drift unexpectedly.
• Review transitive risk: The dangerous package may not be one you added directly.
• Harden CI secrets: Build systems often hold the keys to everything else.
• Sign or verify artefacts where your platform supports it: Especially for containers and release assets.
• Stage updates before production: Fast patching matters, but so does controlled rollout.

For Supabase and Firebase teams, this category often gets ignored because the backend is managed. That's exactly why you should care. Your risk has moved up the stack into dependencies, functions, build tooling, and deployment trust.

9. A09:2021 Logging and Monitoring Failures

Many teams think they have logging because their platform prints errors somewhere. That isn't the same as security logging.

If a customer record is deleted, a role is changed, or a burst of failed logins hits your auth flow, you should know who did it, when it happened, and from where. If you can't answer those questions quickly, your response will be slow and your forensic confidence will be weak.

Log events that matter to abuse

The goal isn't more logs. It's better security-relevant events.

Useful categories include:

• Authentication activity: Successful and failed logins, password resets, MFA changes, device revocations
• Authorisation changes: Role grants, policy changes, admin actions, support impersonation
• Sensitive data operations: Exports, deletions, bulk reads, unusual write bursts
• System trust events: Secret rotation, CI token use, webhook failures, config changes

Common mistakes in BaaS projects

Supabase and Firebase reduce infrastructure work, but they don't automatically produce the audit trail your team needs. A lot of startup apps have functional logs and no security logs.

That leads to avoidable blind spots:

• Logs live only on one service and are hard to correlate
• High-risk actions aren't logged at all
• Logs include sensitive content that shouldn't be there
• No one alerts on suspicious patterns
• Retention is too short to investigate properly

A good rule is simple. If an action affects identity, access, money, or customer data, log it centrally with enough context to investigate. Store those logs somewhere an attacker can't modify undetected after compromise.

Security logging also needs owners. If no one reviews alerts, tuning and routing matter more than volume. A noisy system gets ignored. A focused one gets used.

10. A10:2021 Server-Side Request Forgery

SSRF is easy to underestimate because the vulnerable code often looks helpful. Image proxying, metadata fetching, URL previews, webhooks, import tools, and document converters all make outbound requests on behalf of users. That's the danger.

If an attacker can influence the target and your server fetches it without tight restrictions, they may be able to reach internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or other hosts your users can't access directly.

The classic mistake in serverless and edge code

Bad pattern:

const response = await fetch(req.body.url);

That one line can be enough if there's no validation around destination, scheme, redirect behaviour, or private network access.

Safer approach:

const allowedHosts = new Set(['api.example.com', 'images.examplecdn.com']);
const url = new URL(req.body.url);

if (url.protocol !== 'https:' || !allowedHosts.has(url.hostname)) {
  throw new Error('URL not allowed');
}

const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { redirect: 'error' });

What actually reduces SSRF risk

Most SSRF guidance fails because it relies on blocklists. Attackers are better at bypassing blocklists than organizations are at maintaining them.

Use stricter controls instead:

• Allowlist exact domains: Prefer approved destinations over patterns like “not internal”.
• Restrict schemes: Usually https only.
• Disable redirects where possible: Or re-validate every redirect target.
• Block private and link-local ranges: Don't let outbound helpers talk to internal address space.
• Review helper functions and extensions: Especially URL fetchers inside RPCs, edge functions, and webhook processors.

The image earlier in this article pointed to allowlist-based request control for a reason. That mindset works. Generic deny lists usually don't.

For Supabase teams, pay special attention to functions that use HTTP extensions or fetch remote content. For Firebase or custom serverless code, inspect every endpoint that consumes a URL, even if it looks harmless. SSRF often enters through convenience features added late in the release cycle.

OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities Comparison

| Threat | Implementation Complexity 🔄 | Resource Requirements ⚡ | Expected Outcomes 📊⭐ | Ideal Use Cases 💡 | Key Advantages ⭐ | |---|---:|---:|---|---|---| | A01:2021 – Broken Access Control | High 🔄, complex RLS/role logic and tenant mappings | Moderate–High ⚡, auth infra, automated fuzzing, testing | Critical 📊 ⭐⭐⭐⭐, data theft, privilege escalation, cross-tenant leaks | Multi-tenant apps, role-based systems, privileged APIs | Ensures tenant isolation and enforces least privilege | | A02:2021 – Cryptographic Failures | Medium 🔄, implement proper cryptography and key handling | Moderate ⚡, secret management, HTTPS, key rotation tools | Critical 📊 ⭐⭐⭐⭐, credential/API key theft, breaches, regulatory fines | Apps storing secrets, tokens, backups, frontend bundles | Protects secrets and prevents credential exposure | | A03:2021 – Injection (SQL/NoSQL/Command) | Medium–High 🔄, parameterization across stacks | Moderate ⚡, code fixes, testing, fuzzing of inputs | Critical 📊 ⭐⭐⭐⭐, DB compromise, arbitrary code/data modification | Any system building queries, RPCs, or executing shell commands | Eliminates high-impact code-execution and data-leak vectors | | A04:2021 – Insecure Design | High 🔄, requires architecture and threat-model changes | High ⚡, threat modeling, refactoring, design reviews | High 📊 ⭐⭐⭐, systemic vulnerabilities, costly remediation | New projects, startups, systems needing compliance by design | Reduces many downstream risks when addressed early | | A05:2021 – Broken Authentication | Medium 🔄, secure session/token management and MFA | Moderate ⚡, auth provider, MFA, secure storage, monitoring | Critical 📊 ⭐⭐⭐⭐, account takeover, session hijacking | Apps with user accounts, admin consoles, public auth endpoints | Strengthens identity verification and session security | | A06:2021 – Sensitive Data Exposure | Medium 🔄, field-level protection and logging hygiene | Moderate ⚡, encryption, data classification, retention tools | High 📊 ⭐⭐⭐, PII leaks, fines, reputational harm | Systems handling PII, payment or health data | Protects privacy and supports regulatory compliance | | A07:2021 – ID & Auth Failures (formerly A02) | Medium 🔄, JWT/session validation and recovery flows | Moderate ⚡, runtime monitoring, token rotation, secure cookies | Critical 📊 ⭐⭐⭐⭐, account compromise, session misuse | JWT-based services, RPCs validating user claims | Improves session integrity and prevents token misuse | | A08:2021 – Software & Data Integrity Failures | Medium 🔄, supply-chain and CI/CD hardening | Moderate ⚡, dependency audits, SBOM, artifact signing | High 📊 ⭐⭐⭐, supply-chain compromise, malware injection | Projects with many third‑party deps or automated pipelines | Prevents malicious dependency and deployment tampering | | A09:2021 – Logging & Monitoring Failures | Medium 🔄, design and deploy monitoring/SIEM | Moderate–High ⚡, log storage, SIEM, alerting, retention | Medium–High 📊 ⭐⭐⭐, delayed detection, poor incident response | Production systems requiring auditability/compliance | Enables detection, investigation, and compliance evidence | | A10:2021 – SSRF | Low–Medium 🔄, URL validation and network controls | Low–Moderate ⚡, allowlists, network egress rules | High 📊 ⭐⭐⭐, internal service access, metadata exposure | Webhooks, URL fetching endpoints, image proxies | Prevents internal resource access and metadata theft |

From Vulnerable to Resilient Secure Your Stack Today

The OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities are useful because they give teams a shared language. The mistake is treating them like a compliance poster instead of an engineering workflow. Security improves when each category maps to code review habits, schema rules, CI checks, runtime validation, and clear ownership.

For modern stacks, the biggest shift is this: a lot of risk now lives in configuration and composition. It's not only in handwritten backend logic. It's in RLS policies, storage rules, RPC exposure, mobile bundle contents, secrets in CI, edge functions that trust the wrong input, and deployment pipelines that move too fast to review manually every time.

That's also why generic advice often falls short for Supabase, Firebase, and mobile-connected apps. Teams don't just need to know that broken access control is dangerous. They need to know whether a specific policy leaks rows across tenants, whether an RPC bypasses table protections, whether an APK exposes a hardcoded key, and whether an endpoint can be pushed into fetching internal resources.

The UK context makes this practical rather than theoretical. Breach reporting and widespread attack activity show that application-layer weaknesses still carry real consequences. A checklist alone won't protect your users, your product, or your team's time. Repeatable verification will.

The teams that get this right usually follow the same pattern:

• They secure defaults first: deny by default, least privilege, narrow token scope, minimal data exposure.
• They test trust boundaries continuously: not just before launch, but after schema changes, new features, and dependency updates.
• They validate with proof, not assumptions: especially for auth, access control, secret leakage, and misconfiguration.
• They give developers remediation they can ship: SQL fixes, rule changes, key rotation steps, and clear severity signals.

Manual review still matters. So does architecture work. But neither scales well if you only do them after an incident or during a rushed release freeze. Continuous auditing closes that gap. It catches regressions when teams add a new table, expose a new function, upload a new mobile build, or loosen a rule to “just get this feature out”.

That's where CloudCops' guide to software security is directionally right: secure development works best when it's built into delivery, not bolted on at the end. For teams on fast-moving product cycles, that means using tools that understand your actual stack and test the kinds of failures you're likely to ship.

AuditYour.App fits that model well because it's designed around the modern failure modes this article covered. It can help surface exposed RLS rules, public RPCs, leaked API keys, hardcoded secrets, and real read or write leakage paths in Supabase, Firebase, and mobile applications. That turns the OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities from abstract categories into actionable tickets.

The end goal isn't a perfect scorecard for its own sake. It's a stack your team can change confidently because the risky paths are visible, monitored, and fixable before attackers or users discover them.

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If you're building on Supabase, Firebase, or shipping a mobile app with backend integrations, AuditYour.App is one of the fastest ways to see where your real exposure sits right now. Paste a project URL, upload an IPA or APK, or scan a live app to uncover misconfigured RLS, exposed RPCs, leaked secrets, and other modern AppSec failures with remediation that developers can act on immediately.